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Abstract 
In the vast theoretical literature, a number of arguments have been put 
forward in favor of employee financial participation schemes. Although 
traditionally the main arguments were spurred by objectives such as greater 
equality in the distribution of income and wealth and improving relations 
between workers and capitalist owners, today employee financial participation 
schemes are considered as part of industrial relations based on innovative 
managerial strategies and more flexible remuneration policies, which should 
ultimately result in increased enterprise efficiency. Because share ownership 
and profit sharing schemes are undoubtedly the most popular schemes, 
emphasis has been put on showing the multidimensional relationships between 
employee financial ownership and economic results, as well as on proving that 
the relationship between employee ownership and productivity involves an 
inherently complex interaction.  
The purpose of this paper is to present selected views and attitudes 
toward the relationship between employee participation and company results. 
The theoretical view and empirical research both indicate that after many years 
of conducting empirical research on the benefits resulting from the 
implementation of financial participation plans, the information provided, 
almost entirely by reports, is not yet sufficient to make any unequivocal 
conclusions concerning the influence on the results (productivity) achieved by 
companies. Obtaining such a consensus is additionally hindered because of the 
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lack of clear-cut data concerning the extent to which implemented participation 
schemes contribute to changes in financial results. In conclusion, both the 
previous theory as well as the research conducted so far do not convincingly 
explain the relationship between financial participation schemes and the results 
achieved owing to their implementation, which demonstrates that there is a need 
to conduct further research in this field. In this case any empirical approach 
should concentrate on qualitative, not quantitative research, the latter of which, 
although broad based, does not identify the above mentioned relationships 
precisely enough. Another conclusion that can be drawn is the necessity to 
conduct further research based on larger samples of companies, taking into 
account the specificity of their business and working environment. It seems that 
some other aspects should be also taken into consideration, such as the type of 
the financial participation scheme introduced, because this decision may also 
have an influence on future results. Research should begin a long time prior to 
the introduction of a scheme in the company, which would allow for making 
future comparisons and evaluations of the influence of a given scheme on 
productivity. 
1. Introduction 
Participation schemes based on company profits and employee share 
ownership are immensely popular in the European Union. In the four largest 
countries of the EU, these schemes have covered around 17 million workers 
(19% of employees in the private sector) (Pérotinand Robinson 2002, p. 2). It is 
officially acknowledged that employee financial participation is in accordance 
with state policy, because it is deemed to have a positive influence on efficiency 
and employment and accelerates the fulfillment of other goals of state policy as 
well, for instance the redistribution of wealth or broader participation in creating 
welfare and overcoming conflicts within companies. Of course, it should be kept 
in mind that from the point of view of a particular country, only some types of 
schemes will be preferred, namely those which to a great extent will contribute 
to the achievement of macroeconomic goals. Activities promoting the 
implementation of participatory solutions are conducted in different countries in 
a variety of manners and at differing levels of intensity, therefore one should 
bear in mind that their spread in particular countries will differ. Nevertheless, 
there is a constant, albeit not very dynamic, growth in the number of employees 
taking part in financial participation schemes, and an increase their incidence.  
The research conducted by specialists in the EU countries and the USA 
provides us with a lot of significant information on the nature of these schemes 
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and the results achieved. The data is obtained from, e.g. questionnaires sent to 
enterprises which are listed on the stock exchange and to other large companies 
whose capital is estimated to be at least 200 million euro (Mathieu 2009, p. 11). 
However, gaining relevant information, formulating convincing arguments, and 
obtaining straightforward evidence about the schemes and their effectiveness is 
very difficult for companies that wish to implement financial participation 
schemes. The commonly shared belief is that companies, via the implementation 
of participatory solutions, want to motivate their staff to perform better and more 
efficient work and to convince them to stay with the company, but the evidence 
suggests that in the companies introducing employee participation schemes, the 
work efficiency does not change radically (Pérotinand Robinson 2002, p. 3). 
Therefore, it can be assumed that this is not a direct reason for their 
implementation, and the schemes themselves are simply part of a set of 
employee participation tools (Kruse and Blasi 1997; Long 2002; Robinson and 
Wilson 2001; Pendleton 1997, pp. 103-119; Jirjahn 2002; Kato 2002; Shields 
2002). In turn, the analyses conducted in over 20 EU countries, comprising 
several thousand enterprises, give evidence that financial participation has had  
a positive, or at the very least a neutral, impact on efficiency. The achieved 
results indicate a greater influence of participation in profit sharing plans on 
work efficiency than the influence arising from employee share ownership. This 
might be the result of differences in conditions in the which the schemes are 
implemented, which in turn creates difficulties in measuring the absolute effects 
achieved by such plans using different research results from various countries.  
However, it appears obvious that participation in profit sharing has an 
advantage over share ownership, especially cash based, because the former 
offers measurable, material benefits. Still, it should be remembered that profit-
sharing schemes seem to have a short-term effect, whereas share ownership 
schemes can produce effects in the longer run and are supposedly of a longer 
lasting nature. More and more results suggest that both major forms of financial 
participation have greater influence on efficiency when employees have more 
information about the company’s situation, proper channels of communication 
with management exist, and workers take part in running the company and the 
decision-making processes. This relationship is crucially important in the case of 
employee share ownership schemes, which demonstrate differing results in the 
surveyed countries, and the degree of influence of these schemes also tends to 
show significant disproportions.  
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2. Why do companies implement financial participation schemes? 
The interpretation of the above-mentioned results seems, however, to be 
incomplete and calls attention to a quite important methodological problem, 
namely – revealing the real reasons encouraging companies to implement 
financial participation schemes in the first place. This is an issue which is very 
difficult to examine, i.e. due to the absence of coherent theories that could be the 
basis for conducting empirical research. In addition to this, in many cases the 
research and the results obtained are not comparable because of the considerable 
differentiation of factors and variables applied in the research, as well as the 
variation in the sample of companies chosen for analysis. Thirdly, only a small 
amount of research has been conducted into companies prior to the introduction 
of a financial participation scheme, as a result of which it turns out that most 
research is based on a comparison between companies that use particular 
schemes and companies that do not. Therefore, there is a risk of mistaking  
a feature that is a result of financial participation with a reason for its 
implementation. For example, assuming that financial participation influences 
increased efficiency, the companies using participation schemes may seem to be 
more efficient in this respect, which does not mean, however, that all more 
efficient companies implement financial participation schemes. Finally, the 
empirical research conducted covers schemes with a significant differentiation 
of features, and even researchers have problems with clearly defining particular 
schemes due to the absence of default forms introduced in companies, the 
application of mixed solutions, and the existence of a quite complicated network 
of relationships between them.  
In spite of these methodological gaps, it is widely assumed that financial 
participation schemes yield specific benefits to companies1. These benefits are 
more eagerly awaited in larger enterprises employing more workers, as well as 
in enterprises using collective forms of work and in which remuneration is 
dependent on the collective results achieved by the staff. Profit sharing can be 
treated, then, as a collective incentive, which motivates workers to greater 
cooperation and develops an environment that is favorable to create attitudes 
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 According to M. Weitzman’s theory, a single company implementing, e.g. a profit-sharing 
scheme, may employ more workers, but it will achieve lower income than a company without any 
participation schemes which makes use of fixed remuneration. Weitzman thought that companies 
cannot be expected to use profit sharing schemes willingly unless they are given some government 
grant for this purpose. However, in a situation when participation schemes are treated as incentive 
programs, it is possible to expect some additional benefits, which were not included in 
Weitzman’s theory; cf M.L. Weitzman, The Share Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA, US) 1984. 
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among workers based on a mutual sense of responsibility, cooperative team 
spirit etc. In larger companies, the per- individual costs of implementation of 
financial participation schemes should be lower, which also gives these 
companies an advantage over small and medium-sized companies in terms of the 
introduction of employee participation schemes. On these grounds, researchers 
may adopt the premise that participation schemes are more often applied by the 
large companies listed on the stock exchange, and thus they in most cases they 
targeted to take part in different research projects. However, the practice does 
not confirm this thesis, and the evidence concerning the influence of size of the 
company on the number of implemented schemes is ambiguous. Conclusions 
drawn from the research conducted in the USA, Germany, and Canada show that 
more or less half of the results prove that there is a positive relationship between 
the existence of profit sharing schemes and the size of a company, while in the 
other half there are no such statistically proven relationships (Long 2002, pp. 52-
89; Jirjahn 2002, pp. 148–178; Blasi and Kruse 1996, pp. 60-80; OECD 1995, 
pp. 139-169). Uniquely, in Japan the incidence of profit sharing schemes is 
clearly higher in smaller companies (Kato 2002, pp. 214-235). The ambiguous 
evidence concerning the size of the company and profit sharing may be partially 
caused by the more frequent use of cross-section data (e.g. comparing 
companies with and without profit sharing in a given period). This can be 
indicative of the fact that companies with profit sharing are larger (since the 
implementation of profit sharing increases employment). Employee share 
ownership is also more often applied in larger companies, but the number of 
research projects conducted in the USA and Canada is too small to draw 
straightforward conclusions, and small start-up companies may offer share 
ownership in lieu of compensation (Blasi and Kruse 1996, pp. 60-80).  
The financial results achieved by companies which implemented  
a financial participation scheme are also the subject of much discussion. On the 
basis of the conducted research it is difficult to state clearly whether the results 
improved after the introduction of the schemes. The reasons are similar to those 
mentioned in discussing the size of the company. Only two analyses concerning 
employee participation schemes in France and Italy may indicate a positive 
correlation between profit sharing and increased efficiency, because the research 
conducted before the implementation of the schemes, and continued afterwards, 
clearly showed an improvement in work efficiency and other economic 
indicators (Estrin, Pérotin, Robinson and Wilson 1999; Biagioli and 
Curatolo1999, pp. 99-130).  
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3. Financial participation schemes against the background of employee 
structure and the attitude of trade unions 
Another explored area is the relationship between an introduced 
participation scheme and the employee structure of a company. In this case, too, 
no satisfactory results have been achieved. The research conducted in Germany 
show that profit sharing schemes are more popular in companies dominated by 
physical workers (Heywood and Jirjahn 2002, pp. 44–64), whereas in Great 
Britain schemes based on profit sharing are more frequently used in larger 
companies with a greater participation of mental workers (Robinson and Wilson 
2001). In both studies it has been stressed that in the case of work based on 
employee teams, the probability of implementation of profit sharing is much 
higher than the implementation of other types of participation schemes2. 
Moreover, profit sharing schemes have also gained more popularity in countries 
and companies in which, first of all, remuneration changes were made dependent 
on the results achieved, and second of all, in which the prospects of company 
and product development were frequently uncertain. On these grounds it can be 
assumed that employers in this way wanted to limit the risk of a company 
downturn, shifting the responsibility onto the workers. Some of the research 
conducted in Great Britain and Australia confirmed these relationships (Pérotin 
and Robinson 1998, pp. 135-162; Drago and Heywood 1995, pp.507-531), 
proving at the same time that the companies with profit sharing are more 
frequently encountered in unstable or highly competitive markets. The results of 
the research conducted in Germany and France are more ambiguous (Möller 
2000, pp. 565-582). Additionally, other research has proven that the more stable 
markets of Britain and Germany turned out to be more conducive for enterprises 
using employee share ownership schemes, which does not include the risk of  
a transfer of profit to remuneration (Carstensen, Gerlach and Hübler 1995).  
The research into the influence of trade unions’ attitudes on the 
implementation (or not) of employee participation schemes also does not yield  
a straightforward answer. This results from the fact that union representatives in 
different countries are surveyed only sporadically, and in situations reflecting 
contradictory results. It is also not easy to measure the influence of trade unions 
on strengthening or weakening the efficiency effects associated with the 
implementation of participation schemes. However, it can be observed that after 
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 Similar conclusions were drawn by Osterman while conducting his research into American 
companies (cf. P. Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts It?, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 1994, (47), pp. 173-188) and Long, conducting his research 
into Canadian companies (cf. R.J. Long, Performance pay in Canada, in: M. Brown and J.S. 
Heywood (eds.), Paying for Performance…, op.cit., pp.52–89. 
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their introduction the increases in work efficiency are larger in companies 
managed by employees than in conventional companies with participation 
schemes, be they profit sharing or share ownership. It should be also mentioned 
that the position of trade unions has changed throughout different periods in 
different countries, which is reflected in the research conducted and subsequent 
ambiguous conclusions. Only a few research projects conducted in the USA 
show that in enterprises in which trade unions hold a strong position, the 
influence of profit sharing schemes on efficiency is virtually invisible (Black 
and Lynch 2001, pp. 434-445), and what is interesting, that efficiency was 
higher in companies where the popularity of trade unions was lower (Cooke 
1994, pp. 594, 610). Nevertheless, it ought to be stressed that generally trade 
unions more and more often take part in financial participation schemes, 
focusing their attention on the shape and scope of the contracts and agreements 
signed guaranteeing the current level of remuneration. Otherwise, assuming that 
the introduction of, e.g. profit sharing, and engaging additional workers does not 
bring about the expected increase in work efficiency, the aim of which is to 
offset the expenses incurred due to increased remuneration, the risk of  
a decrease in the current level of remuneration would be significant, which 
cannot be accepted by trade unions (Freeman and Lazear 1995, pp. 27-52)3.  
Roughly speaking, it can be said that at the company level the interactions 
between trade union activities and financial participation may depend on 
whether the implementation of such schemes was initially negotiated with trade 
unions4. In France, the conclusions provided by Fakhfakh and Pérotin indicate 
that both major forms of financial participation have a strong impact on 
efficiency in large companies, where trade unions are well established and trade 
relations are more active.  
Summing up the previous considerations, it cannot be clearly stated that 
financial participation has a positive influence on efficiency. It should be kept in 
mind that these effects may depend on the type of structure of the scheme, the 
way in which it is being managed, the aforementioned external and internal 
conditions, as well as many other factors. The majority of research conducted so 
far has been based on econometric analyses of the function of production, with 
the use of representative data collected in randomly selected enterprises which 
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 Because of that T. Kato draws attention to the fact that profit sharing schemes are more often 
applied in companies without trade unions; cf. T. Kato, Financial participation and pay for 
performance in Japan, in: M. Brown and J.S. Heywood (eds.), Paying for Performance.., op.cit., 
pp. 214-235. 
4
 It should be remembered that the previous examples of introduction of financial participation 
in companies in order to weaken the position of trade unions only made their attitude more rigid, 
therefore it seems necessary to conduct systematic negotiations with them. 
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either have, or don’t have, financial participation schemes5. Aspects that are 
taken into consideration include, among others, the branch, the size of the 
company, the capital, the market share etc. analyzing the influence of the 
variables added to the model by means of participation schemes as a production 
function, and consequently measuring whether the company uses more or less 
capital and labor force to maintain a particular level of production. The analyses 
also yield some additional information concerning the relationship between the 
degree of participation and the company’s efficiency. The degree of 
participation can be understood as, e.g. the size of share capital possessed by the 
workers or the amount of bonuses paid from profit sharing. The influence of 
other effects reinforcing participation are also frequently taken into 
consideration in this case (e.g. a company’s development strategy).  
4. Does the (work) efficiency really rise? 
In discussing the issues connected with work efficiency as an effect of 
implementation of a participation scheme, one could wonder how reliable are the 
conclusions stating the positive impact of this scheme on efficiency. It is known 
that enterprises using financial participation may have higher indicators of 
efficiency than companies which do not use such schemes, but this could also be 
the result of better administration, in other words, it may happen that companies 
which are run more effectively introduce financial schemes in the first place.  
If this was really the case, then it could be assumed that it is more probable that 
the more efficient companies will introduce such a scheme (the reverse causality 
problem). This issue has been frequently pointed out as a weakness in previous 
research. Currently, research makes use of instrumental variables or panel data 
estimation models, which take such possibilities into account and consequently 
it is possible to make the necessary corrections to analysis of the data.  
It is often assumed that since, in most cases, the implementation of 
schemes is voluntary, no one should expect any negative effects resulting from 
using them because if companies were losing money due to financial 
participation, it is almost certain that they would quickly abandon their further 
realization, and consequently only companies which consider them to be 
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 There is also some research conducted in order to prove the relationship between financial 
participation and other economic indicators, such as profitability, however the influence of 
involvement, effort, workers’ attitudes, and other organizational effects correlates more with 
efficiency than profit, which to a large extent depends on many external factors. Because of this, it 
is assumed that the empirical evidence referring to profitability are less reliable than those 
referring to efficiency. 
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beneficial continue using them. This is the main reason why it was possible to 
conduct research in these companies.  
Another, maybe less important doubt, concerns the bias against research 
publications discussing the existence of a negative influence on efficiency – do 
such studies have a smaller chance to be published in the trade press? If so, this 
would also lead to more justifications of the advantages, i.e of positive or neutral 
effects achieved as a result of the implementation of participation schemes. 
Therefore, it could be assumed, perhaps incorrectly. that in the worst case 
financial participation simply has no impact on efficiency (Blanchflower, 
Oswald 1988, pp. 720-730). Still, the issue that needs to be resolved does not 
refer to the influence of participation itself or its lack of an effect on efficiency, 
but rather the circumstances and reasons which make this effect positive. 
The first question that comes to mind is whether, on the basis of the 
research conducted, it is possible to determine which of the two major types of 
participation – profit sharing or employee share ownership – is more likely to be 
connected with an increase in efficiency. Whereas in the previous research no 
special attention was paid to the type of the scheme introduced, currently the 
existing differences between these two programs are more highlighted, which 
allows for obtaining more reliable results about the influence of particular 
schemes on the socio-economic results of companies. However, there is still  
a relatively low number of research projects being conducted which could yield 
information about the effects of both types of schemes in a separate way and at 
the same time. In a situation when companies make use of two schemes, but 
only one type is analyzed by the researcher, or when the dominating program 
combines these two types (e.g. if bonuses from profit sharing are spent on the 
purchase of employee shares), there is a risk of attributing the whole effect, 
either with respect to profit sharing or employee share ownership, to one type of 
scheme. These doubts are gradually being addressed by further research, 
conducted by Kruse and Blasi among others, who applied statistical 
methodology to a great number of previously published research projects 
conducted throughout the whole world, and on these grounds they stated that 
generally in all countries profit sharing schemes statistically have a small but 
real positive influence on efficiency, whereas employee share ownership has no 
or only a very slight impact (Kruse and Blasi 1997).  
D. Jones puts forwards similar conclusions with reference to the 
transformation countries from Central and Eastern Europe, pointing out that 
there is a similar relationship between the two major types of financial 
participation in this region, but supposedly the influence of the schemes on 
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general efficiency is significantly lower6. The above mentioned observations 
may suggest that it is extremely difficult to compare the results achieved by the 
various studies, because the differences in measurements and differing 
approaches applied in research partially deform the relationships under 
investigation. For instance, on the basis of American research into profit sharing 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has been stated that profit sharing increases 
efficiency from 3% to 32%, whereas similar research conducted at the same time 
in Great Britain indicated that efficiency had risen from 3% to 8% (Kruse 1992, 
pp. 24-36; Wadhwani and Wall 1990, pp. 1-17; Cable and Wilson 1989, pp. 366-
375). The estimates achieved in Japan range from around 3% to 9% (Ohkusa and 
Ohtake 1997, pp. 385-402). Analyses of the research conducted in France give 
evidence of an increase in work efficiency resulting from the introduction of 
profit sharing by 7 to 9%, regardless of the sample and the method of 
measurement, or whether the possible presence of an employee share ownership 
scheme was taken into consideration (Fakhfakh and Pérotin 2002, pp. 90-114).  
Different results incline one to state that the focus should be put on the 
influence of particular factors (arising from the introduction of participation 
schemes) on efficiency, rather than on the absolute results. In theory the scope of 
financial participation and the structure of the scheme itself play an important 
role. In places where financial participation increases efficiency there are higher 
financial rewards resulting from profit sharing schemes and a higher level of 
employees’ financial involvement into employee share ownership schemes (the 
number of shares possessed by the workers, i.e. employees’ share in capital), and 
consequently an obvious influence on increases in efficiency. This relationship 
appears to be natural.  
However, while little is known about what happens to the influence of the 
programs on efficiency over time, researchers suggest that it depends on the type 
and structure of a particular scheme – the benefits from cash-based programs are 
rather short-term as opposed to the benefits gained from deferred schemes based 
on shares. Therefore, Jones and Kato prove that the positive effect connected 
with employee share ownership in large Japanese enterprises can only be 
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 D. Jones conducted a review of empirical works analyzing the factors which influence work 
efficiency in Albania, Bulgaria, Russia, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania; and stated that 
apart from the Baltic states, the influence of profit sharing and share ownership schemes on 
efficiency is almost invisible; D.C. Jones, The nature and the effects of worker participation, 
employee ownership and profit sharing on economic performance: A review of empirical evidence 
for transitional economies, paper presented at the Conference on Democracy, Participation and 
Economic Development, Columbia University, April 1999; also cf. M. Uvalić and D. Vaughan-
Whitehead (eds.), Privatisation Surprises in Transition Economies: Employee-Ownership in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar/International Labour Organisation, Cheltenham (UK) 
and Geneva (Switzerland) 1997. 
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observed after some delay in time, which is confirmed in the conclusions 
formulated by Fakhfakh with regard to French companies, where profit sharing 
is often in the form of deferred shares or is realized as saving schemes (Jones 
and Kato 1995, pp. 391-414; Fakhfakh 1998, pp. 115-134). Kruse confirms the 
above and proves that the cash-based profit sharing scheme increases efficiency 
only for a short period, whereas this effect is more long-lasting in the case of 
deferred schemes (Kruse 1993).  
It seems that information plays a great role in increasing work efficiency. 
For example, Kato and Morishima prove that Japanese profit sharing schemes, 
which determine employee’s participation in profits on the basis of a clear pre-
defined formula, have a stronger impact on efficiency than those programs 
which freely distribute bonuses among the workers (Kato and Morishima 2002). 
After studying the results of the National Survey of Industrial relations in 
France, Fakhfakh expressed the opinion that in around one third of the 
companies in which the representatives of both management and workers 
supplied answers to, among others, the following question: Is taking part in 
financial participation schemes voluntary or obligatory? - the replies differed.  
A positive influence on efficiency was observed only in the case of those 
schemes which had been initiated by the workers, whereas programs which were 
in existence only thanks to the efforts of management had no impact on 
efficiency (Fakhfakh and Pérotin 2002).  
It is even possible to go further in these considerations and come to the 
conclusion that information and communication increasing employees’ 
involvement may be an indispensable factor that strengthens the influence of 
financial participation schemes on efficiency, especially with respect to 
employee share ownership, because this type of reinforcement could result in an 
increase in workers’ participation in the decision-making process (e.g. Great 
Britain, Germany). However, in order to prove this, it is necessary to conduct 
further research and formulate even more precise hypotheses regarding the ways 
in which participation in decision-making and financial participation influence 
one another. Such studies should make use of the tools available from the field 
of human resources management, taking into account the attitudes present in the 
company, the perception of transparency, the effective number of employees 
taking part in participation schemes, the influence of such scheme on employees 
in performing their tasks etc. In addition to this, it appears important to use 
organizational strategies which prevent forms of sexual and national 
discrimination. The effectiveness of participation schemes seems to grow when 
it is possible to provide more opportunities and motivation for women and ethnic 
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minorities to be involved in a company’s outcome7. However, it appears to be 
too early to formulate any firm conclusions at this stage of the research. 
5. Summary 
Summing up the above-mentioned considerations, it should be stated that 
one of the most important conclusions resulting from the international empirical 
research into employee financial participation is the existence of quite strong 
evidence of its positive, or at the very least neutral, influence on efficiency.  
It can be even assumed that financial participation may also increase the demand 
for labor in companies using financial participation schemes. Because of this, 
the promotion of financial participation by the state seems justified. Actions 
undertaken by the state may take several different forms. International 
experience shows that financial participation spreads when the companies and/or 
the employees taking part in the schemes are offered some state-support fiscal 
benefits, but such diffusion may also take place without any tax relief. This 
happens probably because even without tax incentives the companies and 
workers can benefit from financial participation schemes. This, in turn, is the 
reason why the costs of implementation of participatory solutions are not 
prohibitive. Promotion should also include trainings and information and 
educational strategies intended for the social partners. Certainly, the type and 
structure of a proposed program is of crucial significance, as well as the possible 
linking of participation schemes with employees’ participation in the decision-
making process. It is clear that financial participation schemes must be 
connected with access to information and communication in order to positively 
impact efficiency.  
International experience also suggests that the development of 
participation schemes requires the stability of employee ownership. Another 
issue resulting from the empirical research is the possibility that other important 
aspects of organizational practice and human resources management (e.g. 
protection of human rights) influence the effects of financial participation.  
In particular, companies may be encouraged to elaborate and implement 
strategies against sexual and ethnic discrimination and promoting equal 
opportunity within the financial participation schemes in order to provide all 
                                                 
7
 The results are less unambiguous for profit sharing schemes, maybe because applying profit 
sharing to a larger group of employees decreases motivation; cf. V. Pérotin and A. Robinson, 
Employee participation and equal opportunities practices: Productivity effects and potential 
complementarities, British Journal of Industrial Relations 2000, (38)4, pp. 557-584. 
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workers with the same access to these programs. On the basis of the evidence 
presented, it is clear that some issues concerning participation schemes have 
been and continue to be the subject of much research, whereas others still 
require further analyses in order to obtain the plausible and detailed information 
that is needed to prepare proper implementation strategies. In this case the 
priority is on gathering comparable and credible statistical data on financial 
participation throughout the world, both at the national and international 
company levels. But this requires the development of research tools based on 
solid analytical methodologies. 
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Streszczenie 
 
PARTYCYPACJA PRACOWNIKÓW W ZYSKACH I WE WŁASNOŚCI – 
WPŁYW NA WYDAJNOŚĆ PRACY 
 
W literaturze można znaleźć znaczną ilość argumentów przemawiających za 
pracowniczą partycypacją finansową. Pomimo faktu, iż najważniejsze przesłanki na 
rzecz partycypacji finansowej wynikały z pobudek takich jak większa równość  
w dochodach i majątku oraz chęć poprawy relacji pomiędzy pracownikami  
i właścicielami przedsiębiorstw, to obecnie programy te są uznawane za element relacji 
przemysłowych opartych na strategiach menadżerskich oraz bardziej elastycznej 
polityce płac, co w rezultacie ma doprowadzić do wzrostu wydajności pracy i szybszego 
rozwoju przedsiębiorstwa. W związku z zauważalną większą popularnością programów 
własnościowych oraz udziału w zyskach, szczególną uwagę zwraca się na 
wielowymiarowe zależności pomiędzy finansowym udziałem we własności i wynikami 
ekonomicznymi, jak również na chęć wykazania, że mechanizm zależności pomiędzy 
własnością pracowniczą a jej wpływem na produktywność ma bardzo złożony charakter. 
Celem tego opracowania jest zaprezentowanie wybranych poglądów na temat postaw 
odnoszących się do wspomnianych zależności. Zarówno sądy teoretyczne jak i badania 
empiryczne pokazują, że po wielu latach analizy korzyści płynących z implementacji 
programów partycypacji finansowej, informacje uzyskane jedynie dzięki raportom nie są 
wystarczające do wypracowania jednoznacznej opinii dotyczącej wpływu partycypacji 
finansowej na wyniki (produktywność) osiągane przez przedsiębiorstwa. Ponadto, 
uzyskanie takiej opinii jest dodatkowo utrudnione przez brak przejrzystych danych oraz 
tego, w jakim stopniu wdrażane programy partycypacyjne przyczyniają się do zmiany 
wyników finansowych. W rezultacie, zarówno dotychczasowa teoria jak i obecne 
badania nie wyjaśniają w przekonujący sposób zależności pomiędzy programami 
partycypacji finansowej a wynikami uzyskiwanymi dzięki ich wdrażaniu, co jedynie 
utwierdza w przekonaniu, iż istnieje potrzeba prowadzenia dalszych badań w tym 
zakresie. W tym wypadku badania empiryczne powinny skupić się na ocenie jakościowej 
a nie ilościowej, która mimo swojego powszechnego charakteru, nie określa powyższych 
zależności w sposób zbyt dokładny. Kolejnym wnioskiem, do którego można dojść, jest 
potrzeba prowadzenia dalszych badań w oparciu o większe próby przedsiębiorstw, 
biorąc pod uwagę charakter prowadzonej przez nie działalności oraz otoczenie  
w którym funkcjonują. Wydaje się, że pod uwagę należy wziąć pewne dodatkowe aspekty, 
m.in. rodzaj wprowadzanego programu partycypacji finansowej, ponieważ decyzja ta 
może oddziaływać na wyniki osiągane w przyszłości. Oprócz tego, badania powinny 
rozpoczynać się na długo przed implementacją programu w przedsiębiorstwie, co 
pozwoliłoby na przeprowadzanie analiz porównawczych i ocenę wpływu danego 
programu na produktywność.  
